On "non-reportability": Russian disinformation, election interference, and blind spots in platform governance

Tom Willaert (VUB), together with Lera Malchenko (OSAVUL), Serge Poliakoff (UVA), Stanislas Yahi (VUB), Alan Benedict Joseph (UvA)

Introduction

A coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) analysis using OSAVUL and Coortweet revealed traces of coordination between antagonistic (political) Telegram channels and a Kremlin-affiliated network of Pravda websites around the time of the 2025 Dutch elections. This independently confirms prior research by the watchdog organization Defend Democracy showing that Pravda deliberately promoted the far-right Forum voor Democratie (FvD) ahead of Netherlands elections (Defend Democracy, 2025).

In this subproject, we investigate this coordinated relationship between Telegram messages and Pravda news articles in more systematic detail. We specifically ask 1) which Telegram channels are amplified through the Pravda network, 2) what the modus operandi behind this CIB amplification is (viz. is it fully automated or not), and 3) whether this type of state-backed coordinated activity is reportable and which platform policy gaps it might reveal.

Network analysis

Based on our initial CIB analysis, which reveals coordination among multiple Telegram channels and Pravda websites, we hypothesize that the connections between both platforms form a more elaborate, directed network. In order to reconstruct this network, we take a digital methods approach (Rogers 2013), and follow the URLs of cited sources at the bottom of each Pravda news article. To this end, we built a custom scraper (based on webdriver approach with selenium), and automatically collected all archived Pravda articles published in the month leading up to election day from the following Pravda websites:

• https://netherlands.news-pravda.com The Pravda website with news articles pertaining to the Netherlands

• https://netherlands.news-pravda.com/en/ The Pravda website with news articles pertaining to the Netherlands (in English)

• https://dutch.news-pravda.com The Pravda website with news articles in Dutch

We then parse each page to extract and store the information in the "source" field of each article. This information is represented as a graph (Fig. 1 below), with one set of nodes representing the Pravda websites, and another set representing the various sources. With regards to the latter, we make a distinction between Telegram channels, websites, and official channels by political parties (viz. the Telegram channel by FVDNL).

Fig 1. Graph representation of connections between Dutch Pravda news articles and sources. Node size = degree, node positioning = Fruchterman-Reingold force-directed algorithm.

As this graph reveals, the majority of the sources cited at the bottom of Pravda news articles in our dataset are Telegram channels. Websites, including the state-run Russian propaganda outlets Sputnik and TASS websites, both of which are subject to EU restrictions on broadcasting and content distribution, are only cited by the English version of the Pravda Netherlands website. On a structural level, it can be observed that a set of Telegram channels, including the official channel of Forum voor Democratie, is referenced by all three Pravda websites. Another, additional set of channels is shared between the Dutch and English versions of the Netherlands Pravda websites. Finally, both the English version of the Netherlands Pravda website and the Dutch Pravda website draw from additional, complementary sets of sources.

While a detailed typology of the Telegram channels referenced and amplified by the Pravda network of news websites is beyond the scope of this blog post, some broader trends can be identified.

First, among the core sources referenced by the three Netherlands-oriented Pravda websites, we find known pro-Russian disinformation outlets such as "warfakes", the channel associated with the fraudulent fact-checking website “war on fakes” (Tuters and Noordenbos, 2024). Other sources include the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID_Russia) and military news channels (e.g. MilThemeZ) showing graphic frontline images and videos (e.g. of wounded Ukrainian soldiers) typically not permitted on other platforms. One remarkable channel that is referenced here is ``berichten_uit_Donbass'' (``messages from Donbass''): a channel with pro-Russian news messages in Dutch apparently broadcasting from the Donbas region.

Second, the Netherlands Pravda websites (in Dutch and English) amplify additional Kremlin-aligned channels. This includes the channels for RT (rtnews), one of the Russian news outlets banned in Europe shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Other channels include official government channels, such as the Ministry of Foreign affairs (MFA Russia) and Russian politicians such as Vladimir Dzhabarov, a long-time member of the Federation Council who has been sanctioned by the USA, the EU, the UK and several allied jurisdictions for publicly supporting Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, including his role in endorsing the use of Russian armed forces and legitimising the annexation of Crimea.

Third, the Dutch Pravda website, which also covers the Belgian context, propagates messages from Telegram channels that can broadly be characterized as far-right and conspiracist. This includes channels dedicated to the QAnon conspiracy theory (qanonbelgium, realqnewspatriot), the channel of the far-right Flemish political activist and former member of parliament Dries Van Langenhove (kiesdries), as well as other antagonistic channels broadly devoted to ``resistance'' (against the authorities) (nederlandsverzetkanaal).

The network of Pravda websites thus offers a new lens on an antagonistic, Dutch-speaking "Telegramsphere" that has been the object of prior research, and which has already been demonstrated to form a ``disinformation network'' in its own right (Willaert et al., 2022; Peeters and Willaert, 2022; Simon et al., 2022). The fact that these channels are now amplified by the Kremlin-affiliated Pravda network raises questions as to what might be the further ties between these communities and the Russian Federation. It is for instance clear that their anti-establishment messaging might align with the Kremlin's efforts to destabilize Western democracies. Yet what are the further mechanisms underlying this amplification?

Time series analysis

One key question with regards to the modus operandi of the Pravda network of websites is the extent to which the amplification of antagonistic Telegram channels might be automated (viz. the result of bot activity), or whether it involves more manual, human curation. Following our digital methods approach, we reconstruct the Pravda websites' posting behaviour by comparing the news article metadata (viz. posting timestamps) with the timestamps of the original Telegram messages. This gives us an indication as to which messages are forwarded on Pravda (and which ones are omitted), and what the time delays are between the original posts and the Pravda articles.

Within the scope of this preliminary investigation, we focus specifically on the relation between the Telegram channel for Forum voor Democratie (FVDNL) and the Pravda Netherlands channel (Dutch version). Our mapping of the relative frequency of sources cited on this Pravda website in the run-up to the election shows an overrepresentation (and thus amplification) of the FVDNL channel, which at a given point amounts to 40% of the content posted on the website (see Figure 2). As these messages are also directly relevant to the election (e.g. showcasing specific candidates), this clearly indicates a preference for the party on behalf of the Kremlin.

Fig. 2 Frequency of FVDNL-based articles on Pravda Netherlands as proportion of all posted articles

An analysis of the time delay between the posting of the original Telegram message and the publication time of the Pravda news article (see Figure 3) shows that there is no consistent difference. As the elections draw nearer, the time delay increases. This suggests that messages are not forwarded automatically, but that some human intervention is involved. A content-based comparison of messages in the original Telegram channel and those amplified by the Pravda news website further indicates that not all messages are forwarded, but that a selection process singles out shorter items (that cannot be framed as a news article), as well as messages that might be deemed too local or narrow in scope.

Fig. 3 Time delay between original Telegram message and post on Pravda Netherlands. The outlier around October 17 where Pravda is seemingly ahead of the Telegram channel is likely due to an edited message on Telegram

Discussion: On "non-reportability"

Our project finds that there are structural connections between Telegram and an international network of Pravda websites. Telegram in particular functions as a key source of news articles posted on the Pravda websites catering to the Netherlands in the run-up to the 2025 elections. The Pravda network thereby amplifies channels that are part of an antagonistic network of channels (including far-right, conspiracist, Kremlin-affiliated channels). A close examination of the relation between Pravda and the channel of FVDNL further shows that this amplification is not indiscriminate, but that messages are selected for political effect.

In terms of systemic risks to elections and democracy that might be posed by this Telegram-Pravda nexus, three interlinked dynamics should be taken into account. First, it should be highlighted that the content in the referenced Telegram channels is already highly antagonistic, to the extent that it would likely be banned from mainstream platforms. Second, the Pravda network amplifies as well as archives this content, opening it up to further indexation and propagation by search engines. Third, the amplification of the messaging of selected political parties signals a clear intent on behalf of the Russian Federation to influence the elections in another country (viz. the Netherlands). Even if this system, which connects a private social media platform with a state-backed propaganda medium constitutes an engine for the spread of disinformation, addressing it through the reporting mechanisms and policies proves challenging.

Telegram's own list of content that is not allowed on the platform includes "spam", "promoting violence", "illegal sexual content", and "activities which are recognized as illegal in the majority of the countries" (Telegram, 2025a). This does not include any kind of reference to information manipulation or disinformation. With regards to the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) and the corresponding obligation to mitigate systemic risks such as disinformation, Telegram finds itself in a grey area. At the moment of writing, Telegram does not report to be a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP), and as such claims not to meet the more strict platform requirements specified in the DSA. It notably argues that not all of its features are social features, and correspondingly it does not meet the threshold of 45 million monthly active users in the EU. It thus only complies with some broader terms specified in the DSA, such as offering reporting mechanisms for illegal content and having a legal representative (based in Belgium) (Telegram, 2025b).

Conclusion

As long as Telegram claims not to meet the criteria for being considered a VLOP, the platform continues to function as a key medium through which the Russian Federation can spread narratives and discourse aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine. Our future work based on the preliminary findings reported here will therefore further map and analyse this Pravda-Telegram connection, and offer a systemic approach to its network-like modus operandi and antagonistic content.

References

Defend Democracy. (2025, October 28). Russian propaganda site ‘Pravda’ promotes far-right FvD ahead of Netherlands elections. Defend Democracy. https://defenddemocracy.eu/russian-pravda-promotes-fvd/

Peeters, S., & Willaert, T. (2022). Telegram and Digital Methods: Mapping Networked Conspiracy Theories through Platform Affordances. M/C Journal, 25(1). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2878

Rogers, R. (2013). Digital Methods. MIT Press.

Simon, M., Welbers, K., C. Kroon, A., & Trilling, D. (2022). Linked in the dark: A network approach to understanding information flows within the Dutch Telegramsphere. Information, Communication & Society, 0(0), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2022.2133549

Telegram. (2025a). User guidance for the EU Digital Services Act. Telegram. https://telegram.org/tos/eu-dsa

Telegram. (2025). Telegram’s DSA Transparency Report. Telegram. https://telegram.org/tos/eu-dsa/transparency-2025

Tuters, M., & Noordenbos, B. (2024). Faking Sense of War: OSINT as pro-Kremlin Propaganda. In M. Mortensen & M. Pantti (Eds.), Media and the War in Ukraine (pp. 97–115). Peter Lang.

Willaert, T., Peeters, S., Seijbel, J., & Raemdonck, N. V. (2022). Disinformation networks: A quali-quantitative investigation of antagonistic Dutch-speaking Telegram channels. First Monday. https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v27i5.12533